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Abstract 
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has been commonly acknowledged to 
have the potential to negatively affect the provision of public education. However, there has 
been an absence of literature analyzing the way in which Canadian federalism and the division 
of powers coupled with the GATS could serve to exacerbate the threat to public education at the 
primary and secondary school level. This paper begins by outlining the GATS provisions of 
non-discrimination, domestic regulation, and market access, and subsequently shows how the 
introduction of these provisions, should governments ‘opt-in’ on education, could serve to 
threaten public education, which has been identified by the United Nations as a basic human 
right. The final sections of this paper examine how the threat to public education posed by the 
GATS is exacerbated by intergovernmental relations, particularly regarding the consultative 
mechanism by which provinces’ policy preferences are conveyed during the negotiation of 
international trade agreements. While this mechanism allows provinces to apply GATS 
provisions to education to different extents, it can also serve to increase the pressure on 
governments to liberalize education by encouraging competition between provinces for revenue 
from private educational institutions. 
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was created to emphasize direct economic 
objectives, namely profit, as the guiding principle behind the exchange of services. Services 
covered by the agreement become commodified, or produced for the sole purpose of sale on the 
market, and little room is left for conceptualization of exchange governed by other objectives. 
This is particularly problematic for services, such as education, which are covered by the GATS, 
but are often provided to achieve a collective societal good without a direct profit motive.1 In 
order to liberalize trade in an area such as educational services under the GATS, a shift in 
perception is required from education provided as a collective societal good to a privately owned 
commodity. This paper will explore the implications of liberalizing trade in educational services, 
given the necessity of this perception shift for Canada. An initial discussion of the general 
provisions contained within the GATS will yield to an examination of the practical problems that 
exist in applying such provisions to education, which include ensuring that education remains a 
basic human right as guaranteed by the United Nations (UN). The scope of the paper will be 
limited to the provision of education services at the primary and secondary level and will exclude 
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considerations of labour external to teaching staff, as this falls outside the classification of 
education adopted by the GATS.2  
While much literature has explored the nature and implications of the GATS for the 
provision of education services, the practical difficulties of negotiating and implementing 
commitments on the liberalization of education services given Canada’s federal structure have 
been largely ignored. These challenges stem from the fact that the federal government has the 
jurisdiction to negotiate international trade agreements, but that education is a provincial 
responsibility. For reasons of international pressure and issue linkage, it appears as though the 
federal government is the primary actor driving this agenda; because education is essential for 
the transmission of values and culture, it is likely that some provinces might resist the shift in 
perception from education as promoting a collective societal good to a commodity that is 
necessary if education services are to be liberalized. The last two sections of this paper will 
explore these tensions and the mechanisms at each government’s disposal to achieve their policy 
preferences. As will be seen, the structure and dynamics of Canadian federalism only serve to 
heighten and reinforce the aforementioned shift in perception from education as a collective 
societal good provided without an explicit profit motive, towards a commodity that can and 
should be governed by the rules of the market as promoted by the GATS. 
  
I: The General Agreement on Trade in Services 
Ratified in 1995 as part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Uruguay Round Agreement, 
the GATS formally expanded the definition of trade encompassed under the multilateral trade 
regime to include services.3 The provision of services underpins most societal activity, ranging 
from  
‘birth (midwifery) to death (burial); the trivial (shoe-shining) to the critical (heart 
surgery); the personal (hair-cutting) to the social (primary education); low-tech 
(household help) to high-tech (satellite communications); and from wants (retail sales of 
toys) to…needs (water distribution).’4 
 
When commodified and performed for a wage, services such as these account for 70 percent or 
more of the economic activity in developed countries.5  
Services are intangible, difficult to monitor, tax and measure. Furthermore, services are 
usually highly heterogeneous. They are often tailored to the needs of the customer and thus vary 
greatly in what is or can be supplied across international borders.6 Finally, because services are 
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typically produced and consumed at the same time, “often with the customers participating in the 
production process,” applying rules and principles of trade in goods to trade in services is highly 
problematic.7  Because of the nature of services, the GATS identifies and targets modes of 
supply. Modes of supply include cross-border supply, which involves the service provider 
moving across borders; commercial presence, which involves all foreign direct investment in 
service providers; and presence of natural persons, which involves labour mobility in the 
provision of services.8 By targeting these modes of supply, the GATS is able to promote stricter 
applications of the foundational principles of the agreement and trade regime more generally, 
which include most-favoured-nation (MFN), domestic regulation, national treatment (NT) and 
market access rules.  
MFN and NT are fundamental principles embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), and help reduce barriers to trade, specific to mode of supply, at the border. 
MFN, which states “each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and 
service providers of any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like 
services and service suppliers of any other country,”9 applies to all disciplines irrespective of 
whether explicit commitments have been made in the area. Thus, any commitment of 
liberalization that is made in the future must be extended to all countries. No immediate 
provision is made to protect advantages extended to countries within regional or preferential 
trade areas, except along “contiguous frontier zones of services that are both locally produced 
and consumed.” This suggests the potential for multilateralizing such commitments, which 
would facilitate continued liberalization.10 NT, which is an internal practice to prevent 
discrimination between foreign and domestic providers, requires WTO members “to accord to 
services and service suppliers of any other Member…treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords to its own like services and service suppliers.”11 Because NT is included under Part III, 
the Specific Commitments section of the GATS, sector-specific conditions and qualifications can 
be placed on its application. This is also true of market access. 
In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, countries must not enact 
limitations on the number of service suppliers, limitations on the total value of transactions, 
limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output, 
limitations on the number of natural persons employed in a particular service sector, measures 
which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture, or limitations on the 
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participation of foreign capital or investment.12 The domestic regulation principle also affects 
investment. In sectors where specific commitments have been undertaken, governments have a 
responsibility to ensure that “all measures of general application affecting trade in services are 
administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner.”13 This entails that  
measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and 
licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services…such 
disciplines shall aim to ensure that such requirements are, inter alia: a) based on 
objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the 
service; b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; c) in 
the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of a 
service.14 
 
This provision exists to ensure that potential government interference affecting the efficient 
functioning of the market and allocation of resources by it will be minimized. 
 The identification of modes of supply in the GATS and the foundational principles of the 
agreement restrict the ability of governments to interfere with the market in the provision and 
exchange of goods and services. As a result of the privileging of the market as the primary 
mechanism for determining the provision of services under the GATS, a perception of services 
as possessing merely an economic objective, the provision of which occurs for the primary 
purpose of securing profit, is supported. Thus, the commodification of services is encouraged to 
the detriment of conceptualizations which see the provision of services as filling an alternative 
objective.  
  There is one provision contained in the GATS which attempts to address alternative 
conceptualizations for the provision of services, however. A governmental authority exclusion 
was included in the agreement to exempt from the rules and principles of the GATS specifically 
“services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority.”15 Services supplied in the exercise 
of governmental authority refers to “any service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, 
nor in competition with one or more service suppliers.”16 This clause was likely included to 
placate the fears of many national governments regarding the breadth and scope of services 
included under this agreement; however, its effectiveness has never been tested through legal 
action. The possible limitations of this clause will be explored subsequently to ascertain the 
implications of applying the GATS to educational services.  
 The prescribed structure of GATS negotiations creates a two-tier system of commitment. 
National governments decide through the negotiation process to which areas they will ‘opt-in’ 
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and make commitments. Once a commitment is made, the opportunity to create a schedule of 
exceptions exists. These exemptions may include terms, limitation and conditions on market 
access, conditions and qualifications on NT, undertakings related to additional commitments, and 
where appropriate, the time frame for implementation of such commitments.17 In Canada, sub-
national units have been given the ability to specify the extent to which commitments will apply 
in areas affecting their jurisdiction.18  
However, built into the GATS is a requirement of progressive liberalization: “in 
pursuance of the objectives of the Agreement, Members shall enter into successive rounds of 
negotiations…with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization.”19 The 
justification for this clause is to promote “the interests of all participants on a mutually 
advantageous basis and to [secure] an overall balance of rights and obligations.”20 Effectively, 
this aims to ensure that concessions given by one country in one round of negotiation will be 
reciprocated in subsequent rounds, thus continually pushing forward the liberalization agenda. 
As such, the exemption schedules presented by national and sub-national governments serve as 
the starting point for future negotiations, in attempts to liberalize areas that had previously been 
protected.21  
 
II: The Nature of Services and Objectives Behind Provision 
While much literature that focuses solely on the economic dimension of services trade has 
ignored the purpose and objectives behind the delivery of services, it is clear that certain services 
are performed for society with little or no profit motive guiding their supply. This may be 
because such services contribute to the aggregate well-being of society and are provided to 
achieve a collective societal good.22 One way of achieving this collective societal good is by 
providing such services as public goods, administered through the public sector.23 Public goods 
are defined as being non-rival and non-excludable, meaning that one’s use does not detract from 
another’s enjoyment of the good, and that the ability to enjoy a public good belongs to everyone 
in society.24 One of the first writers on capitalism and the market, Adam Smith, spoke of public 
goods in the context of being provided where the market would not effectively provide important 
societal functions; this is the purpose of government for Smith.25 Numerous scholars since have 
noted, where objectives behind the provision of service pertain to equity goals and individual 
rights, these services are best provided by public institutions sustained by governments.26 
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Education is one such service that is important for the aggregate well-being of society 
and serves “intersecting developmental, distributional, economic, and social functions” that 
promote the collective good of society.27 In recognition of the importance of education, it has 
been guaranteed as a fundamental human right under the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights. Article 26.1 of the Declaration states: “Everyone has the right to education. Education 
shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.”28 Furthermore, secondary 
education is mandated to be “made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate 
means, and in particular by progressive introduction of free education.”29 Availability in 
sufficient quantity of educational programs, accessibility without discrimination, within physical 
and economic reach, acceptability in form and substance of curriculum, and adaptability to the 
changing needs of society and students should generally characterize all education according to 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1999.30  
Thus, it becomes clear that in order to fulfill these international conditions on what norms 
should surround the provision of education worldwide, governments have a responsibility to 
ensure that education is provided as non-rival and non-excludable at the elementary and 
hopefully secondary level, and thus as a public good. While it can be argued that the market 
could provide education profitably, it will be shown the greater the private provision of 
education in Canada, the greater the difficulty Canadian governments will have in ensuring that 
education remains provided as a public good. Not being able to provide education as a public 
good will threaten Canada’s ability to uphold the standards of education as a basic human right 
as guaranteed under the UN Human Rights Declaration and achieve a collective societal good 
through its provision. 
 
III: Education as Defined Under the GATS 
The perception of education as achieving a collective societal good clearly takes a backseat to 
the perception of education as a profitable commodity if one considers how education is included 
in the GATS. In fact, no specific definition of education exists under the GATS. As a result,  
most WTO Members have scheduled their specific commitments for particular services 
with reference to the Services Sectoral Classification List developed during the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations which is based on and refers to the categories in the United 
Nations Provisional Central Product Classification.31 
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Definitions for educational services appear alongside definitions for other goods, products, and 
commodities. Furthermore, in addition to higher education, adult education and other educational 
services, the classification list encapsulates primary and secondary education. Because each of 
these levels of education is referred to in the classification list, each could potentially be subject 
to inclusion and negotiation in subsequent GATS rounds. As such, the potential for educational 
services at each of these levels to be viewed solely as commodities by their inclusion in the 
GATS is heightened and the ability of governments to protect education as a basic human right 
under the UN Human Rights Declaration and to provide it as a public good could be diminished. 
 
IV: Threats to Public Provision and Maintaining Education as a Public Good 
Maintaining education as a public good will help governments ensure education as a basic 
human right. Free (at least at the primary level) and equal access to education necessitates that 
the provision of education be non-excludable and non-rival. The ability of governments to 
maintain education as such is threatened by provisions contained in the GATS, which limit the 
effectiveness of treasure-based and authority-based policy instruments at the government’s 
disposal. These policy instruments are essential in ensuring that education remains a public good, 
the maintenance of which is secured most confidently through a strong system of public 
provision.  
Firstly, the application of the NT principle would limit treasure-based policy instruments, 
which include any type of funding or monetary incentive used by government to achieve its 
policy goals,32 by mandating that any funding provided by government to a domestic producer, 
also be provided to all foreign producers.33 Although most foreign producers would be private, 
and thus only eligible for the funding made available to private institutions, it remains to be seen 
whether the governmental exclusion clause would actually allow Canadian public schools to be 
exempt from GATS requirements. As will be discussed subsequently, if the governmental 
exclusion clause were not found to apply to Canadian public schools, this would require that 
private providers of education for profit get the same funding as public education providers. 
Although those at the WTO would not likely acknowledge it, this would amount to a de facto 
subsidy for private education providers, as they would still charge fees for their services, in 
addition to obtaining equivalent resources to publicly funded education institutions.34 The result 
of this de facto subsidy would be lower operating costs for private institutions. This would 
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potentially allow private producers to offer more lucrative wages and benefits to teachers, luring 
them away from the public system. This could result in a shortage of teachers, which could mean 
school closures in more remote locations, reducing equality of access. Ultimately, education 
would become excludable and cease to be provided as a public good, undermining the ability of 
education provision to achieve a collective societal good by ensuring that all in society receive 
relatively equal and adequate education. 
Exacerbating the threat NT poses to education is its ability to constrain a second type of 
policy instrument: authority-based instruments. Authority-based instruments involve the ability 
of governments to make regulations, laws and set standards.35 Should governments desire to 
enact regulations to correct any imbalances in equality of access to education created by NT 
requirements as discussed above, they would be unable to do so unless such regulation did not 
result in less favourable conditions of competition for foreign producers.36 This requirement 
severely constricts the options available to governments, as most regulation in attempting to 
correct imbalances created by liberalization, would likely require some distortion of the market 
mechanism to ensure that free and equal access to education could be maintained.  
The application of the market access principle also has the potential to threaten free and 
equal access to education as a basic human right. Because it removes the ability of governments 
to limit the number of producers in a market, the market access principle threatens the potency of 
treasure-based instruments by spreading government spending over a larger number of entities. 
Thus, government resources intended to compensate for what private providers refused to supply 
would be increasingly ineffectual. This is significant because while free and equal access might 
exist de jure, the nature and quality of the access to free education would differ substantially, 
creating de facto inequalities in educational services.37 In this situation, it would be true that 
education would become rival, with one individual’s use of a private provider detracting from 
another’s ability to effectively obtain the same service from a public provider. As education 
resources would have to be spread over an increasing number of service providers, governments’ 
ability to control the quality of education through the use of treasure-based instruments would be 
reduced. Additionally, authority-based instruments would also be constricted by the market 
access principle. This is because the ability of government to regulate the number of educational 
institutions in a given place would be prohibited and relegated to the market. So while resources 
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would be spread increasingly thinly, governments would have no ability to control specifically 
how they were delegated and for what purposes.  
The most significant constraint on authority-based instruments and their ability to ensure 
that free and equal access to education is achieved, however, is domestic regulation.38 This rule 
removes the ability of governments to shape the nature and quality of education through 
legislation that is not in accordance with the principles and spirit of the GATS, which privileges 
the market mechanism in determining supply and demand of such services. Governments’ ability 
to shape the provision of education to achieve a collective good within their society is therefore 
restricted when liberalization commitments have been made. Where NT and market access fail to 
ensure that the market determines the provision of education, the domestic regulation clause of 
the GATS requires governments to show regulations “were ‘necessary’ to achieve a legitimate 
objective, and that no alternative measure was available that was less commercially restrictive.”39  
While some feel reassured in the governments’ ability to make policy and protect the 
public provision of education given the existence of the governmental authority exclusion, the 
protective value of this clause remains to be seen. This clause has not yet been challenged by the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism.40 Until a dispute settlement panel interprets this clause in 
response to a conflict between countries, the extent to which it can be substantively used to 
protect certain public services is unknown. However, considering that the purpose of the GATS 
is to promote the regulation of services trade through the unhindered market mechanism in the 
same way as other commodities governed by the WTO are traded, it is likely that this exclusion 
will be applied narrowly.41 It is not the desire, nor the mandate of the global trade regime to 
protect governments’ ability to promote collective societal well-being where such objectives 
interfere with the efficient functioning of the market. Thus, it is likely that dispute settlement 
panels will seek to interpret the governmental exclusion clause to enhance the free flow of 
services between countries and minimize exceptions allowing for government interference.  
Furthermore, the governmental authority exclusion clause is defined to apply only to 
services provided exclusively by the state neither on a commercial, nor competitive basis.42 This 
can be interpreted as including only services that a government can demonstrate are provided 
exclusively by the state, without charge to its citizens, as well as services that are provided 
without an identical competitor.43 In public education, however, Canadians annually pay about 
$400 per student in direct payments at the primary and secondary level beyond tax contributions. 
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While this varies by province, “nationally, private contributions amount to 6% of total spending 
on elementary and secondary education,” which does not include occasional informal fees and 
fundraising at public schools.44 Thus, claims of exclusive government provision are undermined.  
Moreover, if it is not deemed that public education in Canada is supplied without charge 
to its citizens, it is unlikely that it will be deemed to be without identical competitors, as funding 
is one of the most substantial differences between public education and private secular education. 
In most Canadian provinces, including British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, 
Ontario and Quebec, a certain level of public funding is allocated to private schools.45 In addition 
to the private funding that Canadians give to public primary and secondary schools, this public 
funding further reduces the distinction between education providers and increases the likelihood 
that public education services would be seen as being supplied in competition with other private 
service suppliers. From these examples, it is clear that there are ambiguities surrounding the 
language of the governmental authority exclusion clause, which private providers with a desire to 
gain access to foreign markets may challenge in order to limit governments’ ability to enact what 
will be seen, if viewed in strictly economic terms, as discriminatory practices.  
 
V; GATS and Education: Who is pushing the agenda? 
Although no formal commitments have yet been made by Canada in education, several OECD 
countries have put forward proposals for commitments to be made in future negotiations. At the 
inception of the GATS, Australia was one of the first to make commitments on liberalizing 
education services trade.46 It has committed all modes of supply at both the secondary and higher 
education levels, with no exemptions on market access or qualifications on NT. The 
commitments made cover general as well as technical and vocational education at the secondary 
level in private institutions, and provision of private tertiary education services including 
university at the higher education level.47 Primary education was the only category of education 
excluded.48  
In October 2001, the Australian government produced a proposal to encourage other 
countries to follow in its path. The proposal identified significant impediments it perceived to the 
liberalization of education services involving all modes of supply. In particular, the proposal 
targeted the erection of barriers by governments in response to the growing use of the internet for 
delivering education services, as well as restrictions on the use and import of educational 
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materials.49 These represent two areas where governments have likely tried to retain authority 
over what is taught and the values which are transmitted through education. By targeting these 
areas, it is clear that the Australian government desires to see education increasingly as a 
commodity as opposed to having a separate societal function. The Australian proposal prescribes 
that all Members should consider entering commitments on education services similar to those 
Australia has already made and states, “this particularly applies to those Members who have 
previously failed to enter any commitments in relation to education services,” such as Canada.50  
While Australia was one of the earliest supporters of the liberalization of education 
services, the United States (US) has been more cautious in its liberalization of education 
services. In 1999 it had only committed higher education and some ‘other education’ services.51 
In 2000, however, it produced a proposal stating that it was willing to liberalize higher education, 
training services in particular, as well as educational testing services at all levels.52 While the 
liberalization of education at these levels is outside the scope of consideration of this paper, 
liberalization commitments tend to have spillover effects, especially facilitated by the 
progressive liberalization clause in the GATS. This proposal by the US urges WTO Members 
that have not yet made commitments in education to do so and further proposes “that all 
Members consider undertaking additional commitments relating to regulation of this sector.”53 
Thus, as liberalization is achieved in higher and adult education, it is likely that attention will 
become focused on the secondary and subsequently primary levels of education. Attention will 
also increasingly be focused on countries which have not made any commitments.  
 As is evident from these proposals, there is mounting pressure on Canada to make 
commitments to liberalize trade in educational services. This pressure has been felt most strongly 
by the federal government. Although the federal government does not have jurisdiction over 
education, it has the responsibility in Canada for negotiating international trade agreements, such 
as the GATS.54 Thus, it is interacting and negotiating with other countries on a regular basis in 
numerous areas and on numerous issues. As such, issue linkage becomes a significant factor in 
influencing the government’s actions and decisions.55 Canada may seek to gain concessions on 
liberalization in other areas of trade as well as in other aspects of services trade. As a net 
exporting country, Canada benefits economically from gaining unrestricted, non-discriminate 
access to foreign markets for its products.56 As such, in order to gain access to other markets, 
there are certain issues that Canada must concede to liberalize in order to gain concessions from 
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others. Given the momentum which can be seen in the proposals recounted above, it seems 
probable that education services may become a key area targeted through issue linkage. The 
likelihood of this will increase substantially as more OECD countries agree to liberalize trade in 
educational services. It will also increase as specific exemptions are actively targeted through 
negotiations resulting from progressive liberalization.  
 Furthermore, there are powerful Canadian business interests that would be glad to see 
educational services liberalized by Canada in order to gain concessions from others in the same 
area. While the federal government desires to protect public education, it has stated that “there 
has never been a better time for Canadians…to export education and training products and 
services.”57 According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada is a 
world leader in e-learning, multimedia, interactive and web-enabled learning; special resources 
are provided by the government to businesses engaged in the ‘knowledge industry,’ looking to 
export Canadian educational products and services abroad.58 The implication of this export 
promotion, however, is that in order for Canadian education service providers to gain access to 
foreign education service markets, it may be necessary to give access to Canada’s education 
service markets. Jim Greishaber-Otto and Matthew Sanger have found that the ratio of domestic 
exports to gross domestic product for education was only 1.4% in 2001, which they believe the 
federal government desires strongly to improve. Knowledge-industries are industries in which 
other developed countries are beginning to carve out competitive advantages, which Canada also 
feels it could possess. As such, Grieshaber-Otto and Sanger believe that export development is 
the dominating priority of Canada’s position on education.59  
 
VI: The Role of the Provinces 
Regarding international treaties, the provinces are charged with the responsibility of 
implementing the agreements negotiated by the federal government in so far as they affect 
provincial jurisdiction.60 However, education is the sole jurisdiction of the provinces as specified 
in section 93 of The Constitution Act 1867.61 Education was made a provincial responsibility to 
bring Confederation to fruition. New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Canada West and particularly 
Canada East demanded that their ability to protect their distinct cultures remain intact.62 
Education was seen as a primary entity through which culture could be promoted; it remains an 
important mechanism through which individuals are socialized into understanding the norms of 
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society and are prepared for citizenship.63 Education has remained one of the most important 
vehicles for promoting culture and identity in Quebec, which in particular, feels the need to 
protect its distinct identity from the rest of Canada. Social policies such as education have been 
seen “as an important lever of control and development for the Quebec state [since] the Quiet 
Revolution in the 1960s.”64 A shift in the 1970s to providing bilingual education across Canada 
in recognition of the idea that Canada has two founding cultures, English and French, shows how 
education has been used for the purpose of promoting culture in Canada.65  
Education has also been a source of power and legitimacy for provincial governments.66 
Given that it is a guaranteed human right, accepted as compulsory and universal in Canada, 
education has become one of the most important services provided by provincial governments. 
As such, individuals as well as the international community confer legitimacy on provincial 
governments with the provision of this service. The OECD has recognized Canada as the only 
member state without a federal education ministry, which makes the provincial education 
ministries extremely powerful given that there is no federal oversight in this area.67 Because 
education provides a considerable source of provincial responsibility, power and legitimacy, the 
liberalization of education services trade through an external conditioning framework such as the 
GATS will not likely be supported by all provincial governments to the same extent. 
 The potential for discord, both inter-provincially and inter-governmentally, appears to be 
somewhat mitigated by the commitment structure of the GATS. The first-tier of the commitment 
structure, which is top down in nature, allows the federal government to opt-in to certain areas 
without making specific commitments. The second-tier of the commitment structure, which is 
bottom-up, allows the provinces to specify to what extent NT and market access will be applied 
to the committed area.68 This two-tiered structure is important: given that education is provincial 
jurisdiction, commitments could not be made in good faith by the federal government without 
specific authorization from the provinces. Furthermore, it allows each province to make separate 
commitments without requiring the federal government obtain the same concessions from each 
province.  
 In response to this two-tier commitment structure, some might argue that much of the 
pressure to push the agenda on liberalizing trade in education services is removed from the 
federal government. This would be because the federal government could make a top-down 
commitment to opt-in on education but argue that they could not make any further commitments 
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in this sector given that education is solely a provincial responsibility. While this is de jure true, 
international actors as of late have shown little patience for jurisdictional justifications. In the 
1987 GATT dispute between Canada and the European Community over liquor and wine 
distribution and marketing, the federal government attempted to argue that the division of powers 
prevented it from implementing GATT provisions with respect to provincial liquor board 
practices. The federal government lost this case as the GATT dispute settlement panel stated that 
Canada was obligated to take “‘all reasonable measures’ to ensure that regional and local 
governments adhered to the Agreement.”69 Further dissatisfaction felt by other international 
governments over Canada’s use of jurisdictional justifications for failure to implement 
commitments can be seen in the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) negotiations, 
where the US insisted on a provision that would prohibit discriminatory pricing policies of 
provincial liquor boards.70 The federal government was forced to explicitly include areas of 
provincial responsibility. Both of these scenarios illustrate that international actors have been 
unwilling to accept jurisdictional justifications for failure to comply, and show that a two-tier 
commitment structure does not absent the federal government from pressure.  
Furthermore, international trading partners are also less likely to be satisfied with varied, 
partial commitments across ten Canadian provinces. Differential commitments between 
provinces make it difficult for international actors to plan marketing strategies and anticipate the 
barriers they face upon entry into each market.71 This is a key component of the Australian 
Delegation’s proposal cited above, which refers to the need for greater transparency of 
government regulatory, policy and funding frameworks to aid exporters.72 Thus, while the two-
tier commitment structure of the GATS might appear to help minimize tensions in Canadian 
federal-provincial relations, it might do little to placate international trading partners and may 
enhance the pressures felt by the federal government for commitments in this area. As such, the 
two-tier commitment structure could lead to greater inter-governmental tensions within Canada. 
This potential is exacerbated by the fact that there are instruments at the federal government’s 
disposal for achieving provincial compliance with liberalization initiatives should the federal 
government desire it.  
 The federal government has two mechanisms by which to achieve compliance from the 
provincial governments. The first and most significant is through transfer payments. Although 
the provinces have sole jurisdiction over education, they do not have significant taxation 
  
 
15  
 
 
power.73 As such, the federal government gives substantial transfers to the provinces for social 
services like education. In 1999, federal grants to the provinces amounted to 15 percent of 
provincial revenues.74 This is a significant source of revenue for the provinces, particularly 
poorer ones. Federal transfer payments, however, are transferred on a voluntary basis and are not 
a legal requirement.75 Thus, the federal government possesses the ability to withhold funding 
from provinces that refuse to follow the federal government’s wishes.76 Withholding transfer 
payments would likely be to handicap provincial abilities to provide social programs, as a result 
likely reducing the legitimacy of provincial governments.  
While the likelihood that the federal government would withhold transfer payments from 
the provinces over this issue is unknown,77 the ability to threaten to withhold transfer payments 
gives the federal government a significant amount of power. Furthermore, although withholding 
transfer payments would be an extreme measure taken by the federal government that would 
result in significant federal-provincial discord, its relevance should not be dismissed. During the 
CUFTA negotiations, which included the aforementioned prohibition of discriminatory pricing 
policies by provincial liquor boards insisted upon by the US, Prime Minister Mulroney assured 
the Americans that implementation could be secured with or without the approval of the 
provinces, despite the fact that implementation in areas of provincial jurisdiction constitutionally 
belong to the provinces.78 The Ontario government, “although strongly opposed to the 
agreement, [also] subsequently conceded that this was the case.”79 While the Prime Minister did 
not specify that transfer payments would be the mechanism by which this implementation would 
be secured, this mechanism remains the strongest and most acute at the federal government’s 
disposal.  
 Attempting to co-opt the provinces through an internal trade agreement harmonizing 
standards across Canada would be another instrument the federal government could attempt to 
use to secure its policy preferences. It has been argued that the Agreement on Internal Trade 
struck in the early 1990s was an instrument used by the federal government to achieve 
harmonization around and secure compliance with the North American Free Trade Agreement.80 
The momentum to further liberalize trade within Canada has been kept alive recently by several 
regional inter-provincial trade, investment and mobility agreements, which the federal 
government has supported and expressed interest in expanding.81 These agreements lay the 
groundwork for liberalizing trade in services such as education. Provinces opposed to 
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liberalization might still support such an agreement, however, particularly if the federal 
government opts-in to education at the GATS, as it could establish a legally binding ‘bottom 
line’ for education liberalization and stem a race to the bottom to attract investment.  
 A ‘race to the bottom,’ in the context of the liberalization of education services trade 
refers to the possibility of certain provinces offering more generous liberalization gains in order 
to attract foreign investment. This may occur at the expense of other provinces that also desire to 
attract foreign educational service providers, but want to retain a degree of control over the 
provision of education by limiting NT and market access commitments. Through the two-tier 
negotiation and commitment structure of the GATS, provinces could be encouraged to undercut 
one another, as the electorate and undoubtedly opposition political parties would criticize the 
government for lost revenue potential given that gains by neighbouring provinces that had 
liberalized would likely be evident. It would likely be easier for foreign providers to move to 
another province than another country where better conditions for the provision of service might 
exist. This exacerbates the pressure felt by provincial governments, as it is easier for 
transnational companies “to play 10 provinces…against one another than it is to ‘whip-saw’ 
large national governments.”82  
Competition with other provinces to attract investment and profit from foreign providers 
could undermine efforts to protect education as a public good. Foreign education providers can 
profit by helping to attract international students. Grieshaber-Otto and Sanger state that in B.C., 
international students at elementary and secondary school levels currently pay $11,000 per year, 
which more than covers the costs of hosting the international student and contributes revenue to 
the school district.83 14 school boards in British Columbia have established companies that 
operate overseas providing education services for a profit. Recently, however, the connection 
between these companies and the school boards that have helped subsidize their start-up costs 
has come under scrutiny.84 In order to avoid the conflict of interest that exists in having publicly 
funded school boards controlling and subsidizing private education companies, foreign providers 
which would help school boards and governments profit off of the provision of education 
services to foreign students might be desirable. In order to attract such foreign providers, 
provincial governments might be inclined to limit taxes; however this would reduce “provincial 
governments’ capacity to redistribute through progressive taxation and universal social 
programs,”85 which would have negative effects for public education. 
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Thus while the two-tier negotiation and commitment structure might appear to improve 
intergovernmental relations by recognizing provincial autonomy in the provision of education, 
this structure could actually encourage competition and fragmentation in policy. This could lead 
to increased international pressures on the federal government and incentives for provinces to 
undercut one another, ultimately undermining the attitude that education is a human right and 
can only be protected as such if it remains a public good.  
 
Conclusion 
As a country that considers itself to be a respectable member of the international community, 
Canada has a responsibility to uphold education as a fundamental human right, compulsory and 
accessible at the primary and secondary level. Maintaining free education services at the primary 
and secondary level in Canada and limiting the provision of private education by foreign service 
providers permits the government to continue to supply education as a public good, non-
excludable and non-rival. The GATS threatens the ability of governments to retain education as a 
public good. Through the principles of MFN, domestic regulation, NT, and market access, 
governments’ ability to make public policy through treasure and authority-based instruments 
would be constrained; it is uncertain how well the governmental authority exclusion would 
protect public education or whether public education in Canada would even be covered.  
While the scope of this paper might seem odd given that Canada has not yet made any 
commitments to liberalize education, there is evidence that education at the primary and 
secondary level in Canada is already becoming commodified. This is occurring through 
international student programs and foreign-operating companies created by school boards 
seeking to raise funds to help sustain public education. The commodification that is occurring as 
a result of such endeavours will enhance the ease with which GATS provisions are accepted in 
education at the primary and secondary level, as the requisite perception shift from education as 
achieving a collective societal good towards education as a profitable commodity has already 
begun to occur. This indicates that for Canada, the downward progression from committing to 
liberalize higher levels of education to lower levels of education might occur much more 
quickly, making an analysis of the effects of such liberalization relevant and timely. 
 This is especially so considering the international pressure that Canada faces to begin the 
liberalization of education services trade, as indicated by the proposals from countries such as 
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Australia and the United States. Canada’s trade dependency makes the country highly prone to 
issue linkage from valuable trading partners. Furthermore, the desire of the federal government 
to promote exports of Canadian educational products abroad is bound to strain Canada’s ability 
to resist the liberalization of education services indefinitely. Pressure on the federal government 
is not likely to rescind despite the two-tiered structure of commitments that exists under the 
GATS. While the federal government can argue that education is beyond its jurisdiction, there 
has been minimal empathy in the international trade regime towards the constraints of national 
constitutional structures. Additionally, there are mechanisms at the federal government’s 
disposal for achieving provincial compliance. While the two-tier commitment structure might de 
jure give provinces more autonomy, it de facto increases the likelihood of coercion by the federal 
government to achieve national consensus, and competition between provinces to attract foreign 
investment and business. Overall, for education services to be incorporated into the global trade 
regime under the GATS, a shift in perception of education from a public good to a commodity 
must occur; this shift is only encouraged and reinforced by the structure and dynamics of 
Canadian federalism. 
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